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A Defense of Stand Your Ground Legislation

Field 1

Jarrett Field

Killing another human being is one of the most obvious and egregious wrongs on

nearly any view of morality, most importantly our intuitive sense of right and wrong. And
yet, we believe that sometimes killing is permissible. When is this, and why? We might

agree that when someone else forces us to choose between his life and our own through

violence, we may permissibly choose to save our own lives at the cost of his. The burden for
that choice, the moral weight of the matter, seems to fall squarely on the shoulders of the

person who forces that choice. A non-culpable party, who has done nothing to provoke or
deserve death, seems to have little obligation to sacrifice their own life to spare the life of

someone who intends them harm. This, in short, is often the rationale that is used to justify
self-defense killing, which I will refer to from here on out as “SDK” for brevity’s sake.

But what about when a person intending to self-defend goes to far? What if, either in the
heat of the moment or because of some other trigger, a person who intends to defend

themselves uses too much force, or uses force when it’s not needed? Surely this is also a

wrong, perhaps just as wrong as attempting to kill another in the first place. Certainly some
type of ethical or legal guidelines ought to be in place that prevents such a misuse of selfdefense.

An agent, someone who willingly chooses their actions in response to a set of events

like the threat of violence, must be responsible for any use of excessive force he or she
takes against an aggressing party. An agent must keep to minimum necessary force
whenever possible, as long as doing so does not compromise his or her own safety.
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This principle, which I will call the Minimum Necessary Force Principle, or “MNFP” for

short, is quite simple. MNFP requires only that an agent performing self- or other-defense
only use force where necessary to end a threat to his/her safety, and should not use more

force than necessary to end the threat to his/her safety. This means that self-defense is just

that, defense. Self-defense does not excuse the use of force after a threat has ended, or

before a threat has materialized. An agent may not use excessive force, such as drawing and
firing a gun to prevent an unarmed aggressor from striking or pushing them, although they
may permissibly draw the weapon and express their intent to use it if the attacker

continues to threaten them. An agent may not harm an attacker after the attacker is no

longer capable of harming them, and an agent may not permissibly harm someone they
merely suspect may attack them, without sufficient reason to believe that the opposing

party represents an imminent threat. An imminent threat might be a man who has drawn a
weapon such as a gun or knife and aims it, or states his intent to use it, but anything short
of this, such as the suspicion that the person might be carrying a weapon, is not sufficient

reason to self-defend. The distinction is quite simple. Before a weapon is drawn or a threat
is issued, an agent has only a suspicion that the other person intends to harm them, where
as when a weapon is drawn or a threat is made, the agent has a reasonable belief that the
other person intends to harm them.

All of this is an entryway to begin discussing Stand Your Ground legislation

(henceforth, SYG or SYGL). SYGL is an incredibly hot topic in the news media today, as a
result of a number of extreme cases where the defense has seemingly inappropriately

appealed to SYG. It’s important to recognize that in attempting to evaluate SYGL’s strengths
and weaknesses we ought to look at how SYG ought to and might be used, rather than
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exclusively examining cases where it has been used inappropriately in the past. To look

exclusively at those cases seems to me to be a form of straw-man argumentation, where my

opposition seeks to create an inaccurate description of arguments that favor my position

that are easier to dismantle and thus, defeat. That being said, misuses of SYGL need also be
addressed in order to examine how we might seek to restructure the legislation to ensure
that it is not misused in the future. After all, present misuse does not necessitate future
misuse, especially if changes are made within the legislation itself. Within this paper I

intend to defend the existence of SYGL legislation by first addressing arguments that SYG is

inherently too permissive and allows for too much violence, and then by showing that Duty
to Retreat legislation is too restrictive and puts too much risk on the agent.

Granted those terms, we can move towards establishing what SYGL should permit,

and what it should not permit. Within Florida state law, SYGL reads such that it is

permissible for a citizen to meet force with force, including lethal force provided that “he or
she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to

himself or herself or another.” As it reads, it should be clear that cases often cited as making
SYGL laughably permissive often fail to acknowledge that it is necessitated that the agent
reasonably believe that there is risk of death or great bodily harm. As previously

mentioned, often times protest of SYGL provide straw-man arguments by attacking cases
where SYG has been invoked to defend an agent who in fact could not have reasonably

believed that (s)he was at risk of death or great bodily harm. While there may be a degree
of epistemic opacity (that is, uncertainty about the facts of the matter) regarding what

constitutes reasonable belief of such risk, I think we should be convinced that there are

clear cut cases where such a belief is reasonable, and thus invoking SYGL is permissible,

and cases where such believe is not reasonable, and thus invoking SYGL is rightly
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laughable. I’ll give an example case for each.

Reasonable Belief: An agent, Smith, is walking down the street and encounters a man,
Jones, who draws a gun and tells her that he intends to kill her, and will do so quickly

provided she gives him her purse. Smith is also carrying a gun, and draws it and kills Jones
before Jones can kill her.

Unreasonable Belief: An agent, Smith, is walking down the street when she notices a man,
Jones, has been following behind her for the last ten minutes or so. Smith is carrying a gun
and believes Jones intends to harm her, and thus decides to turn and shoot and kill Jones.
In Reasonable Belief, I think we can all grant that Smith had sufficient reason to

think that Jones intended her great bodily harm. Because of her having sufficient reason,
her belief is then justified and reasonable, as SYGL asks, and her choosing to kill Jones is
legally permissible. I think it’s also fair to say that this case is ethically permissible, as it

resembles a standard “Villainous Aggressor” case in which the aggressor intends to kill the
agent and can’t be stopped without force. In Unreasonable Belief, however, Smith does not

have sufficient reason to think that Jones intended her great bodily harm. Therefore, Smith
does not have a reasonable belief, and it is not legally permissible for Smith to kill Jones.

There are most certainly less clear cut cases than these, and the primary objection to SYGL

is that it is too permissive and allows for an unreasonable degree of force to be taken by the
agent in the name of SDK. There is also growing concern that SYGL allows for or incites
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violence against racial minorities, especially blacks. This would mean that even if SYGL is
ideal in principle, its existence might lead to such undesirable consequences, namely

unnecessary escalation, especially in the instance of race-based crime, that we ought to

think that it should not be implemented. There may also be a non-consequentialist version
of this concern, that is, one less focused on the bad consequences that SYGL might lead to
and yet still object to SYGL ‘s existence, but I will not take it up here. The majority of

arguments levied against SYGL seem to be consequence-focused, so I will address those

concerns exclusively. I believe that both of these problems stem from a misunderstanding
of SYGL’s interpretation and application, rather than an inherent problem with the

legislation itself, such that the legislation could be adjusted to deal with such worries.

The primary means for ensuring SYGL is not too permissive is appealing to MNFP. Any

given case that seems to show that SYGL permits the use of excessive force on the part of

the agent will be in clear violation of MNFP, by definition. So, in order for SYGL to come into
effect, an agent must still adhere to MNFP. Should an agent violate MNFP and thus
impermissibly escalate a confrontation, SYGL is no longer applicable. Cases that

demonstrate this impermissible escalation might resemble the previous Unreasonable

Belief case, or run slightly differently such that the agent uses clearly excessive force, like
shooting an unarmed aggressor rather than merely drawing their gun and issuing a
warning.

The issue of race-related crime is a slightly more difficult issue to settle. Data exists

that shows that white Americans often mistakenly think that black men are more likely to
be a physical threat to them, when in fact the data shows that black against white crime is
very low(Welch). Because of this, we might think that it would be common for white
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Americans to mistakenly believe black men to be a threat to their safety in such a way that

they might invoke SYGL to defend themselves from a non-existent threat. While plausible, it
seems to me that to a large extent the issue can be settled on a case-by-case basis. Even if

whites are more likely to mistakenly think of blacks as a threat, should they invoke SYGL to
‘defend’ themselves and by doing so violate MNFP in a way that resembles the

Unreasonable Belief case, they’ve clearly acted morally and legally impermissibly. And
certainly, if a white person were to invoke SYGL against a black person in a case that

resembles Reasonable Belief, and are not violating MNFP, they are morally and legally

permitted to SDK. The larger issue here is what happens when there’s a kind of mutual
escalation that stems from a case that resembles Unreasonable Belief, where the

unreasonable belief may or may not stem from racism. Let me give a new case to illustrate
this problem, tabling the race issue for a moment.

Unreasonable Belief to Reasonable Belief: An agent, Smith, is walking down the street

when she notices a man, Jones, has been following behind her for the last ten minutes or so.
Smith is carrying a gun and mistakenly believes Jones intends to harm her, when in fact

Jones has no such intention. Smith turns and confronts Jones by drawing her gun, warning

him of her intent to use it should he attack her. Jones is surprised and frightened by Smith’s
drawing of the gun, and now believes Smith intends to kill him, although Smith also has no
such intention and has clearly stated that she has no such intention. Jones decides to draw

his own gun and fires at Smith, attempting to kill her, believing that he is defending himself
from her. The shot misses Smith, and she shoots and kills Jones when he does so.
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This is a case of permissible escalation where the agent at first adhered to MNFP

and then invoked SYGL. Although Smith at first had an unreasonable belief that Jones

intended to cause her harm, her drawing of her weapon and issuing of her warning were

permissible. Similarly, Jones’s forming of the unreasonable belief that Smith intended him

harm permitted him only to draw his own weapon and issue a similar warning at most,

while firing his weapon was in clear violation of MNFP, given Smith’s warning. Better yet,

given Smith’s warning, Jones could merely have held up his hands and told Smith he
intended her no harm, and walked away. Because of Jones’s violation of MNFP by

attempting to kill Smith under the unreasonable belief that Smith intended to kill him,

Smith then had a reasonable belief that Jones intended her serious harm, and could invoke

SYGL to SDK Jones. Certainly Smith had an unreasonable belief that Jones intended to harm

her at the beginning of the case, and a reasonable belief by the end. Had Jones not chosen to
attack Smith, and Smith’s belief that Jones intended her harm remained unreasonable and

Smith chose to shoot Jones anyway, it would be in clear violation of MNFP and we would be
right to laugh at Smith’s attempt to invoke SYG as an explanation of her actions.

I believe this case demonstrates that even granted a systematic tendency for agents

to develop unreasonable beliefs about other’s intents to harm them, the permissibility of
their actions can still be evaluated on a case by case basis, such that all will depend on
whether or not a threat was present.

What has to be acknowledged here is what my view means in light of systematic

racism against black Americans. Given the data that white Americans will often mistakenly
believe blacks to be some sort of a threat when in fact they are not, my view may put a

burden on blacks that some might object to. Any view that places a special burden on one
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group of people over another through no fault of their own ought to be carefully examined
to ensure the view is not too demanding.

Were the original Unreasonable Belief to Reasonable Belief case racially loaded such

that Jones were black and Smith white, we might develop a concern about the frequency of
such cases. In light of data that suggests whites will often mistakenly believe blacks to be a
threat, my argument seems to almost necessarily put a larger burden on blacks to

deescalate should such a situation arise. While this may be true, it seems that there is a
clear need for social education and conditioning so that people, specifically whites, are

aware of their mistaken tendency to develop unreasonable beliefs about blacks being a

threat to their safety. Both conditions seem equally mandatory, blacks ought not to allow
unreasonable beliefs developed by whites to escalate into violence, and whites ought to
work to correct their tendency to develop the unreasonable beliefs in the first place.

I’ve suggested that should Smith in the above case mistakenly believe Jones to be a threat

to her, Jones has a moral responsibility to express carefully that he is not a threat. This will
likely take the form of him putting his hands in the air, expressing he means no harm, and

walking away in the other direction if possible. I don’t believe this is a large enough burden,
even granted that it might be placed on one group of people more often than others, to

make us think that SYGL coupled with MNFP is problematic enough to be dismissed. While

such an occurrence might happen more often to blacks and thereby put a special burden on
them to have to act this way more frequently than other groups, the burden to the

individual in the given situation is relatively light, and asks merely for adherence to MNFP
by attempting to avoid violence before it starts, given the mistaken belief of Y and X’s
ability to show Y that she is mistaken.
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One might argue to this point that asking for a physicalized ritual displaying non-

aggression from blacks might be worryingly psychologically damaging. Asking any specific
demographic to engage in a ritualized physical behavior (in this case, demonstrating nonaggression by putting hands in the air and stating that they don’t intend harm, should

someone form the unreasonable belief that they do) might force that demographic into

wrongly absorbing the belief that they are in fact threatening criminals, or something of the
like. I share this concern, and find it notably troubling, and it should not be dismissed too
quickly. In light of this concern, I think we ought to question what continues to allow
whites to form the mistaken beliefs about blacks in the first place, and place the

aforementioned special burden on whites to work to ensure that their beliefs about threats
to their safety aren’t being formed solely on the basis of race and racism. Perhaps

permitting the existence of SYGL comes with the necessary price of public education

regarding data on violent crime, in hopes to prevent these mistaken beliefs from occurring

so frequently. As long as this push for public awareness is sufficiently rigorous to lessen the
likelihood of mistaken beliefs based on race, I don’t think concerns about SYGL and the
ritualization of non-aggression displays are quite as worrisome.

Even if we were to think it significantly problematic, I don’t believe we can

reasonably address the problem merely by eliminating SYGL, as we lack reason to think
that eliminating SYGL would make cases resembling Unreasonable Belief less likely to

occur. The issue at hand here might edge slightly away from a consequentialist one, in the
sense that we’re concerned both with the frequency that blacks might be mistakenly

believed to be threats and threatened in response, and that the mistaken beliefs take place
at all. It seems that without SYGL and given Duty To Retreat, neither concern is fully
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addressed, or even made less likely to occur. SYGL and Duty To Retreat themselves both

deal primarily with the actions and consequences of agents in such situations, neither has

any obvious effect on the intentions or mindset of agents prior to conflict, so we can likely
safely assume that eliminating SYGL will not affect the frequency at which blacks are

mistakenly believed to be threats in the first place. That issue seems likely to stem from

systematic racism that is embedded in society, not from any piece of legislation that gives

ruling on SDK. Whether or not we have permissive or restrictive legislation on SDK, views
that lead to mistaken beliefs about other agents being threats to safety may still abound.
This is a problem that seems wholly unrelated to SDK, and needs to be addressed from
elsewhere in other forms.

From there, I don’t believe we have sufficient reason to think that SYGL will make it

any more likely for whites to impermissibly act on mistaken beliefs about blacks being a

threat to their safety and cause a threat to them. While it might make whites with mistaken
beliefs to confront blacks as Y does initially in the above case, we have no reason to think
that SYGL paired with MNFP will make it more likely for whites to impermissibly violate

MNFP and attack or kill blacks using SYGL as an excuse. In fact, in such cases where SYGL is
used as an appeal for an impermissible killing because the killing violates MNFP, certainly

we think the agent has done something morally, and thereby also legally, wrong. The agent
has, after all, acted without a reasonable belief that the other party was a threat to her

safety. If SYGL were to be carefully paired with MNFP, it would allow only for an agent with
a mistaken belief (lacking a reasonable belief) to confront another agent, but not take any
violent action. Here’s a case to clarify this.
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Permissible Stand Your Ground without Reasonable Belief: A white woman, Smith,

believes a black man that has been following her for a few blocks, Jones, to be a potential
threat to her safety. Given SYGL and that she is frightened, but knowing she lacks a

reasonable belief that Jones is a threat to her, Smith decides to confront Jones by turning

towards him, drawing her gun, and warning him that she will shoot him in self-defense if
necessary.

The above case shows what an agent is permitted to do with SYGL paired with

MNFP when she lacks a reasonable belief. Any more than the action Smith takes would

likely be impermissible. For example, should Smith have chosen to physically confront

Jones by pushing or striking him, believing to be “defending” herself, she would be in clear
violation of MNFP, which requires a physical threat to be readily apparent for a physical

response to be appropriate. Given MNFP, only a verbal warning is permissible for Smith,

and I believe that this is appropriate in that it is not too restrictive on the agent, and not too
permissive that it allows for undue harm on the potentially innocent Jones. If Jones abides

by MFNP, it should also be clear that in the above case Smith is not causing a threat to him.
Smith is merely a conditional potential threat, such that she has made it clear she will only

harm him if he makes an attempt to harm her. Given this, while we might have to accept

SYGL might make it more likely for whites to confront blacks in the above manner, I don’t
think we have any reason to believe SYGL paired with MNFP generates any likelihood of
impermissible attacks in the name of self-defense.

This is of course, not the only concern with SYGL, and perhaps not sufficient alone to

justify its existence to others concerned about the consequences it might generate. If in
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Unreasonable Belief to Reasonable Belief only Smith survives and there are no witnesses,

how do we know that Smith had a reasonable belief that Jones intended to kill her, and how
do we proceed legally? And how do we know that Smith didn’t intend to shoot and kill

Jones, and knowing there would be no witnesses, assumed that SYGL would allow her to
get away with it?

These are incredibly difficult questions, but I think they’re problematic because of

epistemic opacity, not because of SYGL. With or without SYGL, the same sort of scenario
could occur. Imagine the following case.

Planned Murder: Smith lives in a state with no SYGL and intends to kill Jones and get away
with it by appealing to self-defense. Smith lures Jones into an alleyway with a dead-end,

and turns and shoots him. In court, Smith says that Jones chased her into the alleyway and
tried to kill her. She concedes that she had a duty to retreat, but argues the location of her
“attack” prevented her from fulfilling the duty, thus her only choice was to SDK Jones.

This case shows that SYGL is in no way necessary for the aforementioned worries to

be present. If there were no witnesses, we have no way of knowing whether Jones really

did chase Smith into an alleyway and attempt to kill her, or if Smith is merely using SDK as
a way of getting away with murder. These worries are a problem with lack of information,
not a problem with SYGL.

Granted the previous arguments, I believe we can conclude that SYGL is not too

permissive because it does not allow for impermissible escalation and can fit in accordance
with MNFP. It also does not make it any more likely for an agent to attempt or succeed at
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getting away with murder by appealing to SDK. Concerns that racism might make violent
crime more likely with the existence of SYGL also seem unnecessary with MNFP in place,
and a close reading of the law’s necessitation of “reasonable belief.”

A common (but perhaps under thought-out) counter argument to SYG relies on

deferring to the agent having a duty to retreat (henceforth, DTR or DTRL) when confronted
with potential violence. It’s worth noting here that the two systems are in many respects

diametrically opposite. Where SYG allows for an agent to opt to defend themselves should
they so choose, DTR requires (legally obligates) agents to make an attempt to flee before
resorting to self-defense.

Where others worry that SYG is too permissive and allows for too much violence, I

worry that DTR is too restrictive and puts agents at too much risk when confronted with
violence. Here are a few cases to demonstrate this worry.

Failed Retreat 1: An agent, Smith, is walking down the street and carrying a gun when a

man, Jones, confronts her. Jones tells her that he intends to kill her, and will do so quickly
provided she gives him her purse. Smith does not know that Jones is also carrying a gun,

but rightly assumes that she could draw her gun and kill Jones before he could react, or at
least draw the gun and warn Jones of her intent to use it. But, given that they are on an

open street and knowing that she has a DTR, decides to attempt to flee. Smith turns to run,
and Jones shoots her in the back and kills her.

Failed Retreat 2: An agent, Smith, is walking down the street in a state with no SYGL and

that does have DTRL when a man she knows, Jones, confronts her. Jones states his intention
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to rape and kill Smith. Smith knows that Jones does not have a gun. Because Jones is a small
and frail looking man, Smith (rightly) believes she could defend herself if she stays where
she is, and also (wrongly) believes she can outrun Jones. Because Smith has a DTR, and

believes she can outrun Jones, turns and tries to run. Jones is actually faster than Smith, and
because of this is able to tackle her to the ground, where Smith hits her head and is

disoriented. Because Smith is impaired from hitting her head, Jones is able to kill her.
It seems to me that cases like these illustrate how DTR can force an agent to flee and

then be harmed because of doing so, when they could have otherwise defended themselves.
While DTR seems to have minimization of unnecessary violence in mind, it is potentially

costly to the agent because of how restrictive it is. This is to say, DTR is very interested in
minimum force, but fails to take into account what minimum amount of force may be

necessary to ensure the safety of the agent. It is plausible to assume that there are some

circumstances, as illustrated in the above cases, where retreating actually increases the risk
to the agent’s safety, rather than keeping both the agent and the aggressor safe. In light of
this, I think we ought to reject DTR in favor of the less restrictive MNFP, which is still
sufficiently restrictive to prevent impermissible uses of force or escalation.

One last issue worth addressing is the name to which we give legislation that does

not obligate an agent to attempt to retreat. We may be concerned that “Stand Your

Ground,” the name itself, encourages a sense of heroism and has the potential to exacerbate

the likelihood in which agents might use an impermissible level of force and violate MNFP. I
find this worry entirely reasonable, and have no reason to defend the usage of “Stand Your
Ground” as a way to refer to such legislation. Perhaps “No Duty To Retreat” might be a
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more appropriate way to refer to such a group of laws and avoid a worry that the wording
might encourage impermissible behavior.

In summary, I believe that SYGL paired with MNFP is a sound piece of legislation

that ought to be implemented nationwide, as it is sufficiently restrictive when properly

understood and does not allow for use of excessive force or increase the likelihood that
excessive force be used, and it is also not too restrictive and does not increase the

likelihood of harm to the agent attempting to defend themselves or flee. On the contrary, I
think we ought to see DTRL as too restrictive and demanding on the agent looking to

defend themselves, and likely to lead to cases where agents are killed or harmed, who
might have otherwise been able to keep themselves safe.
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